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State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B.#5867 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. #6247 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite '100 
Boise, 1083703 
(208) 334-2712 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
ALiSHA ANN MURPHY, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Nature of the Case 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
NO. 40483 
TWIN FALLS COUNTY NO. CV 2008-
2992 
APPELLANTS REPLY BRION 
REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a (successive) post-conviction appeal. Before the Court of Appeals, 
Alisha Murphy contended primarily that the district court erred in denying her motion for 
appointment of counsel to assist in her successive post-conviction action. She argued 
that four of the claims presented in her successive petition had, at a minimum, a 
possibility of validity, such that counsel was required to have been appointed. With 
regard to each of those four claims, she asserted that she had established that: (a) the 
underlying claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel have a possibility of validity; 
and (b) these claims were properly presented in a successive petition because, owing to 
the incompetence of her original post-conviction attorneys, they were not asserted at all 
in her original post-conviction case, they were inadequately investigated and asserted in 
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the original case, and/or they were waived against Ms. Murphy's wishes in the original 
case. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case 
to the district court. With regard to the four claims argued about on appeal, the Court of 
Appeals held there was no possibility of validity as to three of those claims. Thus, it held 
that there was no error in denying counsel as to those three claims, and there was no 
error in summarily dismissing those three claims. However, as to the final claim, the 
Court of Appeals held that there was a possibility of validity as to that claim, such that it 
was error for the district court to have failed to appoint counsel, and it reversed the 
district court's dismissal order as to that claim and remanded the case for further 
proceedings-apparently on that claim only. 
Ms. Murphy petitioned for review on the basis that the Court of Appeals should 
not have remanded her case with an instruction that counsel be appointed to pursue 
one claim only; the proper remedy was to vacate the district court's order denying her 
motion for appointment of counsel and summarily dismissing her petition, and order that 
counsel be appointed in the case. She asserted that, although this precise issue is a 
question of first impression for this Court, the authorities (the UPCPA and existing Idaho 
case law) point to the conclusion that if the petitioner raises the possibility of a single 
valid claim, she is entitled to the assistance of counsel in the case generally. 
This Court granted Ms. Murphy's petition and has agreed to review all issues in 
the case. 
With regard to the merits of her various claims, Ms. Murphy has previously 
incorporated by reference the arguments presented to the Court of Appeals. Because 
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the State has done the same, no reply as to those issues is required herein. However, 
the State's arguments concerning the propriety of remanding Ms. Murphy's case for the 
appointment of counsel as to only one claim do warrant further discussion. Thus, the 
limited purpose of this Brief is to address those arguments. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The factual and procedural histories of this case were previously set forth in 
Ms. Murphy's Appellant's Brief (Adjusted) and her Appellant's Brief in Support of 
Petition for Review and, therefore, are not repeated herein. 
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ISSUES 
1. Is Ms. Murphy entitled to relief on the grounds argued in her Appellant's Brief 
(Adjusted) and her Appellant's Reply Brief? 
2. Assuming only a portion of Ms. Murphy's claims are determined to have the 
possibility of validity, what is the appropriate remedy? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Ms. Murphy Is Entitled To Relief On The Grounds Argued In Her Briefing Before The 
Court Of Appeals 
Because both parties have, without elaboration, incorporated by reference their 
briefing before the Court of Appeals as to the substantive claims presented, no further 
discussion of those claims is required herein. 
II. 
Even If Only A Portion Of Ms. Murphy's Claims Are Found To Have The Possibility Of 
Validity, The Appropriate Remedy Is To Vacate The District Court's Summary Dismissal 
Order, Reverse The Order Denying Counsel, And Remand The Case Generally 
As set forth in some detail in her Appellant's Brief in Support of Petition for 
Review, it is Ms. Murphy's contention that, if a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, 
when considered in light of all of its supporting materials, is sufficient to raise even a 
single possibly-valid claim, counsel should be appointed to represent the petitioner in 
the case. In response, the State argues that post-conviction petitions should be 
evaluated claim-by-claim, and that counsel should be appointed only as to those 
specific claims which appear to have the possibility of validity. 
There are a number of flaws with the State's current position, most of which were 
preemptively addressed in Ms. Murphy's Appellant's Brief in Support of Petition for 
Review. However, two of them deserve further mention. 
First, Ms. Murphy has argued that existing precedent has suggested that if there 
is a possibility of a valid claim, counsel should be appointed in the case generally. (See 
Appellant's Brief in Support of Petition for Review, pp.11-12 (quoting Charboneau v. 
State, 140 Idaho 789 (2004), as speaking in terms of appointment of counsel in the 
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"proceeding," not on a claim-by-claim basis).) In response, the State acknowledges the 
authority cited by Ms. Murphy, but asserts that more recent authority suggests that 
counsel may, in fact, be appointed on a claim-by-claim basis. (See Respondent's Brief 
on Review, p.13 (citing Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651 (2007), and Mellon v. State, 148 
Idaho 339 (2009).) 
Contrary to the State's present contention, however, the Court has not 
"repeatedly indicated that a trial court's obligation to appoint counsel extends only to 
claims that are possibly valid 'such that a reasonable person with adequate means 
would be willing to retain counsel to conduct a further investigation into the claim.'" (/d. 
(quoting Swader).) The State misunderstands Swader. The portion of Swader which 
discussed counsel conducting further investigation "into the claim," singular, was not 
speaking in terms of the relief to be provided if it is determined that the district court 
erred in failing to appoint counsel; it was discussing the standard for evaluating a claim 
to determine whether that claim has the possibility of validity.1 Swader, 143 Idaho at 
655. Indeed, the relief ultimately granted in Swader was not the appointment of counsel 
as to one or more individual claims; it was a general remand with reversal of the order 
denying the motion to appoint counsel. 2 Swader, 143 Idaho at 655. 
Second, in its brief, the State cites three cases-Hust v. State,3 Charboneau, and 
Swader-for the following proposition: 
1 The same argument goes for Melton, the other case relied upon by the State. See 
Melton, 148 Idaho at 342. 
2 The petitioner in Swader raised a host of post-conviction claims. Swader, 143 Idaho 
at 652-53. Notably, this Court did not analyze each and every one of them individually; 
it simply discussed two of them before reversing the district court's order generally. Id. 
at 654-55. 
3 147 Idaho 682 (Ct. App. 2009). 
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If, after reviewing the facts alleged in the petition, the trial court finds only 
one potentially viable claim, it should appoint counsel for that claim and 
give the petitioner notice of its intent to deny counsel and summarily 
dismiss the remaining claims unless the petitioner alleges additional facts 
to establish the possible validity of those claims. 
(Respondent's Brief on Review, p.14 (emphasis added).) However, those cases simply 
do not say that the district court can appoint counsel as to only a portion of the 
petitioner's claims, while denying counsel as to the rest. See Swader, 143 Idaho at 
653-54 (discussing the requirement that the motion for appointment of counsel be 
decided in advance of summary dismissal, and discussing the general standard that 
counsel should be appointed if the petitioner has raised the possibility of a valid claim); 
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793 (same); Hust, 147 Idaho at 684 (same). In fact, Hust 
cites Charboneau for the proposition that "(o]nly if al/ of the claims alleged in the petition 
are frivolous maya court deny a request for counsel," Hust, 147 Idaho at 684 (emphasis 
added), and, as noted, Charboneau spoke in terms of the appointment of counsel in the 
"proceeding,,,4 Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792. 
Thus, contrary to the State's assertion. there is no existing precedent supporting 
its contention that post-conviction petitions should be reviewed on a claim-by-claim 
basis, and that, when potentially meritorious claims are identified, counsel should be 
appointed only as to those claims. In fact, although this is technically an issue of first 
impression for this Court, all signs point to the notion that, if a petition is non-frivolous, 
counsel should be appointed in the case. 
4 In Charboneau, the Court quoted favorably from Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676 
(2001), wherein it was made clear that the standard for appointment of counsel is 
whether "the post-conviction proceeding is frivolous." Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792 
(quoting Brown, 135 Idaho at 679) (emphasis added). Accord Swader, 143 Idaho at 
653. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, as well as in her previously-filed briefs, 
Ms. Murphy respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
denying her motion for appointment of counsel, and vacate its summary dismissal order 
and its order denying her I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion. She further requests that this Court 
remand her case to the district court with an order that counsel be appointed in the 
case, and that an evidentiary hearing be conducted. Alternatively, she requests 
whatever lesser relief may be appropriate. 
DATED this day of March, 2013. 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
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